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1.- Introduction 
In April 2016, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published an article online entitled 
“Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent” in which they 
introduce a Gedankenexperiment that allows them to conclude that, if “quantum theory is 
applied to model an experimenter who herself uses quantum theory”, then “no single-world 
interpretation can be logically consistent.” (Frauchiger and Renner 2016: 1). The argument 
intends to support the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, to the extent that it 
forces us “to give up the view that there is one single reality.” (Frauchiger and Renner 2016: 
22). In a new version of the paper, now entitled “Quantum theory cannot consistently describe 
the use of itself” and published in Nature Communications in September 2018, the authors 
moderate their original claim. In this new version, the same Gedankenexperiment is proposed 
to “investigate the question whether quantum theory can, in principle, have universal 
validity”, and the conclusion is “that quantum theory cannot be extrapolated to complex 
systems, at least not in a straightforward manner.” (Frauchiger and Renner 2018: 1); on this 
basis, the authors consider how the different interpretations of standard quantum mechanics 
and the different quantum theories should face their result. 
Since its first online publication, the Frauchiger and Renner (F-R) argument has caused 
quite a splash in the field of quantum foundations. In general, it has been considered as a new 
no-go result for quantum mechanics. For instance, in the website of the Perimeter Institute of 
Theoretical Physics one can find a video of the talk entitled “Frauchiger-Renner no-go 
theorem for single-world interpretations of quantum theory”, given by Lidia del Rio (2016) 
only two months after the original publication, in June 2016. But, in many cases, more 
extreme reactions can be found, based on conceiving the F-R argument as a kind of proof of 
the inconsistence of quantum mechanics. This idea, for instance, is suggested by a post of the 
Department of Physics of the ETH Zürich (the university to which Frauchiger and Renner 
belong), entitled “Searching for errors in the quantum world” (Würsten 2018), which asks 
“How is it possible for a theory to be inconsistent when it has repeatedly been so clearly 
confirmed by experiments?” (the post is reproduced in the website of Science Daily). In turn, 
with the title “Reimagining of Schrödinger’s cat breaks quantum mechanics — and stumps 
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physicists”, an article appeared in the section “News” of Nature (the article is reproduced in 
Scientific American). And if one does not restrict the attention to highly reputed journals and 
websites, it turns to be impossible to keep track of the huge number of comments to the 
supposedly new no-go result in other websites and personal blogs. 
In spite of the differences between the two versions of Frauchiger and Renner’s article, 
both are based on the same Gedankenexperiment, which, according to the authors, leads to an 
argument whose conclusion is a contradiction that supposedly expresses the new no-go result. 
The purpose of this short article is to clarify the core of the F-R argument, in order to show 
how the contradiction is obtained. On the basis of this clarification, we conclude that the 
result of the F-R argument has been overestimated and should be reconsidered from a more 
cautious perspective. 
2.- The Frauchiger-Renner argument 
The Gedankenexperiment proposed in Frauchiger and Renner’s article is a sophisticated 
reformulation of Wigner’s friend experiment (Wigner 1961). In that original thought 
experiment, Wigner considers the superposition state of a particle in a closed laboratory 
where his friend is confined. When Wigner’s friend measures the particle, its state collapses 
to one of the components. However, from the outside of the laboratory, Wigner still assigns a 
superposition state to the whole composite system particle+friend+laboratory.  
The F-R argument relies on duplicating Wigner’s setup. Here we will follow Jeffrey 
Bub’s presentation of the argument, since it extracts its structure in a simple and elegant way 
(Bub 2018). Let us consider Alice and Bob located in separate and isolated labs SA and SB. 
Alice measures the observable cA  of a biased “quantum coin” in the state 
( ) ( )1 3 2 3+c cA Ah t , where c Ah  and c At  are the eigenstates of cA . She prepares a 
qubit in the state 0q B  if the outcome is ch , or in the state ( )( )1 2 0 1+q qB B  if the 
outcome is ct , and sends it to Bob. When Bob receives the qubit, he measures its observable 
qB  with eigenstates 0q B  and 1q B . 
Now, let us consider the two labs SA and SB with all their content (the quantum coin/the 
qubit, Alice/Bob, the measuring apparatuses, etc.) as two composite many-body systems. The 
state of lab SA is now described by ( ) ( )1 3 2 3+A Ah t , where Ah  and At  are the 
eigenstates of the observable 
−
= ⊗c A cA A I , where −A cI  is the identity observable 
corresponding to all the degrees of freedom of SA different from those of the quantum coin. In 
other words, A  is the observable cA  of the quantum coin but “viewed” from the perspective 
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of the whole lab SA. Analogously, the two alternative states of lab SB are described by 0 B  
and ( )( )1 2 0 1+B B , where 0 B  and 1 B  are the eigenstates of the observable 
−
= ⊗q B qB B I , where −B qI  is the identity observable corresponding to all the degrees of 
freedom of SB different from, those of the qubit. In other words, B  is the observable qB  of the 
qubit but “viewed” from the perspective of the whole lab SB. Therefore, state of the composite 
system SA+SB can be expressed as:  
( )1 0 0 1
3 A B A B A B
h t tΨ = + +               (1) 
As Bub clearly notes, eq. (1) does not presuppose “a suspension of unitary evolution in favor 
of an unexplained “collapse” of the quantum state.” (Bub 2018: 2).  
The Gedankenexperiment continues by considering two observers, Wigner and Friend, 
located outside the labs, who will describe the whole situation from the viewpoint of the 
observables X and Y of the systems SA and SB, respectively: 
• X has eigenvectors fail X  and ok X , such that: 
( )1fail
2X A A
h t= +   ( )1ok
2X A A
h t= −           (2) 
• Y has eigenvectors fail Y  and ok Y , such that: 
( )1fail 0 1
2Y B B
= +   ( )1ok 0 1
2Y B B
= −           (3) 
So, in terms of these new eigenvectors, the state Ψ  of SA+SB (see eq. (1)) can be 
alternatively expressed as: 
2 1fail 0 1
3 3X B A B
tΨ = +                  (4) 
1 20 fail
33 A B A Y
h tΨ = +                  (5) 
1 1 1 3
ok ok ok fail fail ok fail fail
412 12 12X Y X Y X Y X Y
Ψ = − + +  (6) 
In order to simplify the presentation, let us use the expression ‘O: o’ to represent the 
proposition ‘the observable O has the value o’. Following Bub’s presentation, the following 
results can be obtained. From eq. (4), the pair ( ): ok, : 0X B  has zero probability, so 
( ): ok, :1X B  is the only possibility when : okX . From eq. (5), the pair ( ): ok, :Y A t  has zero 
probability, so ( ): ok, :Y A h  is the only possibility when : okY . In turn, eq. (6) shows that 
the pair ( ): ok, : okX Y  has a probability of 1 12  in a joint measurement of X and Y by 
Wigner and Friend. But the combination of these three results “is inconsistent with any pair of 
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outcomes for Alice’s and Bob’s measurements” (Bub 2018: 2), since the pair ( ): , :1A h B  has 
probability zero in the state as expressed by eq. (1). 
Frauchiger and Renner notice that the argument relies on three assumptions:  
(QT) Compliance with quantum theory: quantum mechanics applies to systems of 
any complexity, including observers. 
(SW) Single-world: measurements have a single outcome 
(SC) Self-consistency: measurement outcomes for different observers are logically 
consistent. 
In the 2016 version of their paper, Frauchiger and Renner implicitly accept (QT) and (SC): as 
a consequence, they claim that their argument shows that “no single-world interpretation can 
be logically consistent” (2016: 1) and, therefore, “we are forced to give up the view that there 
is one single reality” (2016: 22). In the 2018 version, they admit the possibility of different 
theoretical and interpretive viewpoints regarding their result, and include a table that shows 
which of the three assumptions each interpretation or quantum theory violates (2018: 9). 
For our purpose it is essential to stress why the result obtained by Frauchiger and 
Renner has been so appealing for the quantum foundations community. The F-R argument is 
based exclusively on standard quantum mechanics: it is independent of any interpretation of 
the standard formalism. In particular, it does not appeal to the hypothesis of collapse or to any 
other assumption about measurement. In the original Wigner’s friend argument, the paradox 
arises when comparing the collapsed state of the friend inside the lab and the superposition 
assigned by Wigner from the outside. The F-R argument, on the contrary, does not assume 
that the measurements made by the observers collapse the state of the measured system: eq. 
(1) is the complete uncollapsed quantum state of the composite system SA+SB, and the 
contradiction is obtained by considering exclusively the probabilities that this state allows us 
to infer. The only trick is to consider cases of probability equal to zero or to one. Besides its 
simplicity, the advantage of Bub’s presentation of the argument is that it makes completely 
clear how the contradiction arises with no appeal to any interpretive assumption about 
measurement.  
The reactions to the F-R argument have been multiple and varied. An interesting 
response emphasizes an implicit assumption of the argument: the non-relational view of 
quantum mechanics is an indispensable premise of the derivation. This is the view of Časlav 
Brukner (2018), who considers, from an operational perspective, that the self-consistent 
condition SC is too restrictive, since “the states referring to outcomes of different observers in 
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a Wigner-friend type of experiment cannot be defined without referring to the specific 
experimental arrangements of the observers, in agreement with Bohr’s idea of contextuality” 
(2018: 8). From a non-operational standpoint, Dennis Dieks (2019) advocates, in the line of 
Carlo Rovelli’s relational view (1996), for a perspectivalist interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, according to which more than one state can be assigned to the same physical 
system: the state and physical properties of a system A are different in relation to different 
reference systems Bi; when the perspectival nature of quantum states is included as a premise, 
no contradiction can be inferred from the F-R argument. According to Richard Healey (2018), 
the F-R argument implicitly depends on an inconclusive additional assumption, intervention 
insensitivity, which guarantees that the truth-value of an outcome-counterfactual is insensitive 
to the occurrence of a physically isolated intervening event. 
After supplying his clear and elegant reconstruction of the F-R argument, Jeffrey Bub 
(2018) claims that what he calls the “Frauchiger-Renner contradiction” shows that quantum 
mechanics should be understood probabilistically, as a new sort of non-Boolean probability 
theory, rather than representationally, as a theory about the elementary constituents of the 
physical world and how these elements evolve dynamically over time. In resonance with his 
information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics, Bub conceives quantum 
mechanics formulated in Hilbert space is fundamentally a theory of probabilistic correlations 
that are structurally different from correlations that arise in Boolean theories. Analogously to 
special relativity, as a theory about the structure of space-time that provides an explanation for 
length contraction and time dilation through the geometry of Minkowski space-time with no 
dynamical considerations, “[q]uantum mechanics, as a theory about randomness and 
nonlocality, provides an explanation for probabilistic constraints on events through the 
geometry of Hilbert space, but that's as far as it goes.” (Bub 2018: 3). 
From a completely different perspective, the conclusion of the F-R argument was 
rejected on the basis of Bohmian mechanics, the paradigmatic one-world no-collapse quantum 
theory. For instance, Anthony Sudbery (2017) offers a Bell-Bohmian reconstruction of the 
argument, claiming that it supplies a counter-example to the conclusion obtained by 
Frauchiger and Renner. With a similar reasoning, Dustin Lazarovici and Mario Hubert (2018) 
assert that any Bohm-type theory provides a logically consistent description of F-R 
Gedankenexperiment if the state of the entire system and the effects of all measurements are 
taken into account. 
In the following section we will reconstruct the F-R argument in detail only on the basis 
of the standard formalism of quantum mechanics: its consequences for other quantum theories 
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will not be analyzed. Nevertheless, such a reconstruction will allow us to bring to light the 
logical structure of the argument in order to discuss its validity and scope. 
3.- Reconstructing the argument 
Frauchiger and Renner assume that the states involved in their argument always evolve 
unitarily. In fact, collapse is not included as one of the three assumptions on which the 
argument relies. Moreover, in the 2016 article they informally discuss the alternatives left by 
their result: either future experiments will show the need of replacing the original theory by 
adding, for example, an objective collapse, or we are forced to reject any single-world 
interpretation (Frauchiger and Renner 2016: 3). The assumption of unitarity also explains the 
fact that, in the 2018 article, collapse interpretations are included in the list of interpretations 
of quantum mechanics as those that violate the assumption QT (compliance with quantum 
theory) in order to circumvent the contradiction resulting from the argument (Frauchiger and 
Renner 2016: 9). 
Following this idea suggested in the original papers, in the previous section we have 
pointed out that the F-R argument does not appeal to the hypothesis of collapse. However, not 
everybody agrees with this. For instance, Franck Laloë considers that the argument illustrates 
no inconsistency in quantum mechanics, but only the well-known fact that “the exact point at 
which the von Neumann reduction postulate should be applied is ill defined.” (Laloë 2018: 1). 
Mateus Araújo (2018), in turn, finds “the flaw in Frauchiger and Renner’s argument” in the 
fact that the predictions that Frauchiger and Renner claim to be followed from quantum 
mechanics can only be obtained when collapse is added. Independently of the soundness of 
these opinions, it seems quite clear that, if the conclusion of the F-R argument depended on 
collapse, it would lose much of its appealing since it would offer no much novelty when 
compared with the original Wigner’s friend argument. By contrast, what has shocked the 
physical community is that the argument seems to show an internal inconsistency of quantum 
mechanics, independently of any interpretive addition. 
Nevertheless, Araújo’s and Laloë’s claims show that there is no consensus about which 
F-R argument’s premises are. For this reason, it is worth reconstructing the argument in order 
to show that the “Frauchiger-Renner contradiction” follows with no need of observers (or 
measurements) collapsing the quantum state. But the same reconstruction will allow us to 
bring to light a controversial step in the development of the argument. 
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Let us use the symbols ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’, and ‘→’ for negation, conjunction, disjunction and 
conditional, respectively, as usual. Still following Bub’s presentation, the contradiction is 
obtained in the following way: 
• Eq. (4) shows that the probability of : okX  and : 0B  is zero. Therefore, it is certain that 
: okX  and : 0B  is not the case: 
( ) ( )Pr : ok : 0 0 : ok : 0X B X B∧ = ⇒ ¬ ∧              (7) 
But this last proposition amounts to say that (recall the definition of the conditional in terms 
of conjunction: ( )p q p q→ ≡ ¬ ∧ ¬ ), if : okX , then : 0B  is not the case or, equivalently, 
if : okX , then :1B : 
( ): ok : 0 : ok : 0 : ok :1X B X B X B¬ ∧ ≡ → ¬ ≡ →          (8) 
• Eq. (5) shows that the probability of : okY  and :A t  is zero. Therefore, it is certain that 
: okY  and :A t  is not the case: 
( ) ( )Pr : ok : 0 : ok :Y A t Y A t∧ = ⇒ ¬ ∧               (9) 
Analogously to the previous case, this last proposition amounts to say that, if : okY , then 
:A t  is not the case or, equivalently, if : okY , then :A h : 
( ): ok : : ok : : ok :Y A t Y A t Y A h¬ ∧ ≡ → ¬ ≡ →           (10) 
• Eq. (6) shows that the probability of : okX  and : okY  is not zero (in particular, it is 1 12 ). 
Therefore, it may happen that  
: ok : okX Y∧                         (11) 
• From eqs. (11), (8) and (10), it can be concluded that, in the case that : okX  and : okY , 
then :A h  and :1B : 
: :1A h B∧                          (12) 
• But from eq. (1), it is clear that the probability of :A h  and :1B  is zero. Therefore, it is 
certain that :A h  and :1B  is never the case: 
( ) ( )Pr : :1 0 : :1A h B A h B∧ = ⇒ ¬ ∧                (13) 
• Therefore, in the case that : okX  and : okY , the following contradiction obtains 
( ) ( ): :1 : :1A h B A h B∧ ∧ ¬ ∧                   (14) 
This means that the conclusions obtained by Alice and Bob, who rely on the state vector as 
expressed in eq. (1), contradicts the conclusions obtained by Wigner and Friend, who have 
access to the state vector as expressed by eq. (6). 
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As this reconstruction shows, the contradiction between the observers’ conclusions does 
not need that the quantum state collapses: they can agree on their disagreement just by 
looking at the uncollapsed quantum state. As stressed above, it is precisely this fact that 
makes the F-R argument novel and astonishing: it seemingly shows an internal contradiction 
at the level of probabilities, independently of any interpretation.  
But, is this argument legitimate? We will show that, despite of its persuasiveness, one of 
its steps requires further scrutiny. First, it is necessary to identify the Hilbert space in which 
the whole argument unfolds. If Alice’s lab SA is represented by the Hilbert space AH , then the 
observables A and X are represented by operators acting on AH  and their respective 
eigenvectors Ah  and At , and ok X  and fail X  belong to AH . Analogously, if Bob’s lab 
SB is represented by the Hilbert space BH , then the observables B and Y are represented by 
operators acting on BH  and their respective eigenvectors 0 B  and 1 B , and fail Y  and ok Y  
belong to BH . Therefore, the state Ψ  of the composite system SA+SB is represented by a 
vector belonging to the Hilbert space = ⊗AB A BH H H . 
Now let us consider the three propositions involved in the derivation of the 
contradiction: 
• In order to conclude that ( )Pr : ok : 0 0X B∧ = , eq. (4) should be expressed in the basis 
{ }- fail 0 , fail 1 , ok 0 , ok 1X B X B X B X BX B =  of ABH , that is, the basis defined by 
the observables X and B: 
2 1 1fail 0 fail 1 ok 1
3 6 6
Ψ = + −X B X B X B           (15) 
Therefore, the proposition ( ): ok : 0 : ok :1¬ ∧ ≡ →X B X B  is obtained in the X-B 
context. 
• Analogously, in order to conclude that ( )Pr : ok :Y A t∧ , eq. (5) should be expressed in the 
basis { }- fail , fail , ok , okY A Y A Y A Y AY A h t h t=  of ABH , that is, the basis defined 
by the observables Y and A: 
1 1 2fail ok fail
36 6
Ψ = + +A Y A Y A Yh h t           (16) 
Therefore, the proposition ( ): ok : : ok :¬ ∧ ≡ →Y A t Y A h  is obtained in the Y-A 
context. 
• Finally, in order to conclude that ( )Pr : ok : ok 0∧ ≠X Y , eq. (6) is expressed in the basis 
{ }- fail fail , fail ok , ok fail , ok ok= X Y X Y X Y X YX Y  of ABH , that is, the basis 
defined by the observables X and Y. Therefore, the proposition : ok : okX Y∧  can be 
meaningfully expressed only in the X-Y context (both when it is true and when it is false). 
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• Eq. (12) is obtained by combining eqs. (11), (8) and (10) in the following simple logical 
argument: 
: ok : ok ,  : ok :1 , : ok : : :1X Y X B Y A h A h B∧ → → ⇒ ∧        (17) 
But, in which context can those three propositions be combined so as to obtain : :1∧A h B ? In 
order to simultaneously assert a proposition referred to observables X and Y, a proposition 
referred to observables X and B, and a proposition referred to observables Y and A −the three 
premises of the reasoning of eq. (17)−, the context X-Y-A-B should be defined. The derivation 
expressed in eq. (17) would be valid if the bases X-B, Y-A and X-Y were really alternative 
expressions of a same basis of the complete Hilbert space ABH . However, this is not the case: 
they are three different bases, rotated with respect to each other. This is a consequence of the 
fact that: 
(i) X does not commute with A: in the Hilbert space AH , the two eigenvectors ok X  and 
fail X  of X are rotated with respect to the two eigenvectors Ah  and At  of A (see in eq. 
(2) how they are interdefined), and  
(ii) Y does not commute with B: in the Hilbert space BH , the two eigenvectors ok Y  and 
fail Y  of Y are rotated with respect to the two eigenvectors 0 B  and 1 B  of B (see in eq. 
(3) how they are interdefined).  
The fact that the bases X-B, Y-A and X-Y are different bases of ABH  can also be demonstrated 
by defining three observables XBO , YAO , and XYO  acting on ABH , whose eigenvectors are the 
members of the bases X-B, Y-A, and X-Y respectively: it can be proved that those three 
observables do not commute with each other, [ ], 0≠XB YAO O , [ ], 0≠XB XYO O , and 
[ ], 0≠YA XYO O  (see the detailed proof in the Appendix). 
Summing up, the bases X-B, Y-A, and X-Y, in the context of which the propositions 
: ok :1X B→ , : ok :Y A h→  and : ok : okX Y∧  can be respectively asserted, are different 
bases of the same Hilbert space ABH . But we have learnt since the first courses on quantum 
mechanics that propositions corresponding to different bases (assigning precise values to non-
commuting observables) cannot be simultaneously asserted. Therefore, if those old lessons are 
taken into account, the “Frauchiger-Renner contradiction” does not follow. 
4.- What the argument shows 
But, then, what does the F-R argument show? When the reasoning is carefully reconstructed, 
it is quite clear that the argument proves that, in quantum mechanics, if we combine 
propositions corresponding to different contexts by means of standard logic, consistency is 
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not guaranteed. Or, in other words, the argument proves that the structure of the quantum 
propositions is a non-Boolean lattice (see, e.g., the already classical Bub 1997). But this is 
clearly not a new result. 
Somebody might retort that, since the argument derives the contradiction only in terms 
of probabilities, the combination of different contexts is a legitimate strategy. But this is not 
the case if the probabilities equal to one are used to assert non-probabilistic propositions. In 
fact, given a spin-1/2 particle and two orthogonal directions z and x in physical space, it can 
be inferred that ( )Pr : : 1z zS S↑ ∨ ↓ =  and ( )Pr : : 1x xS S→ ∨ ← = . Moreover, as usual, in the 
zS  context, the first probabilistic result can be used to assert the proposition : :z zS S↑ ∨ ↓ , and 
in the xS  context, the second probabilistic result can be used to assert the proposition 
: :x xS S→ ∨ ← , with no need of any measurement. Nevertheless, the fact that the two 
propositions were inferred from probability-one results does not legitimize the assertion of the 
combined proposition ( : : ) ( : : )z z x xS S S S↑ ∨ ↓ ∧ → ∨ ← : we cannot conclude that the spin in z 
is in one of its two possible values and the spin in x is in one of its two possible values. 
Summing up, the F-R argument derives a contradiction without appealing to collapse 
but by using classical logic to connect propositions coming from different contexts. What are 
the possible reactions to this result? One of them, as advanced above, is to admit the 
contradiction as a reductio-ad-absurdum proof of the non-Boolean structure of the quantum 
propositions. In this case, the result can be considered correct but not novel at all. However, 
from a less benevolent perspective somebody might claim that the argument is plainly wrong, 
because at present everybody knows, at least, that the conjunction of propositions 
corresponding to the values of non-commuting observables is forbidden in the quantum 
domain. And the word ‘forbidden’ must be understood with a meaning rooted in the very 
praxis of science: if in a quantum mechanics exam a student concludes a conjunction of 
propositions corresponding to the values of non-commuting observables, the exam would 
certainly be disapproved. From this second position, physics is not reduced to a mere set of 
formalisms; it is a dynamical body of knowledge in continuous development. Therefore, a 
physical result must be assessed not only in the context of the formalism from which it is 
derived, but also in the broader framework of the physics’ community knowledge at the 
historical time when it is obtained: a result that is novel at one time, may be trivial at a later 
time, and may even be strictly wrong when, after many years, it is already well known that the 
assumptions on which its derivation was based are unacceptable.  
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5.- Conclusions 
In this brief article we have analyzed the F-R argument by following the clear and 
illuminating presentation offered by Jeffrey Bub in a very recent work. On the basis of a 
detailed reconstruction of the argument, we have shown that the F-R argument is 
interpretively neutral; in particular, it does not require collapse to lead to its conclusion. The 
contradiction clearly pointed out by Bub arises by considering exclusively the quantum state 
of the whole situation, without appealing to effective measurements or to any interpretive 
addition to the formalism. This fact is what explains the strong repercussion of the Frauchiger 
and Renner’s paper, and the alarmist consequences that have been drawn from it: that the 
argument “breaks quantum mechanics” or that the theory is inconsistent, or that there are 
“errors in the quantum world”. In fact, the paper seems to show that the problem does not lie 
in any interpretive addition to, or reformulation of, the standard formalism, but in the core of 
quantum mechanics itself. The final aim of our reconstruction of the argument was to show 
that the derivation of the F-R argument’s conclusion requires the conjunction between 
propositions corresponding to different contexts, that is, propositions that assign precise 
values to incompatible observables; this result should suffice to temper those worrying 
opinions about quantum mechanics. 
In the last section of his article on the F-R argument, Bub asks “What are the options in 
the light of the Frauchiger-Renner result?” (Bub 2017: 4). Of course, one option is adopting a 
non- representationalist, informational view of quantum mechanics, as Bub himself does since 
several year ago (Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson 2003). Another option is advocating for a 
relationalist (Rovelli 1996) or perspectivalist (Dieks 2009) interpretation of the theory, as 
explained above. Certainly, the many-worlds interpretation (Everett 1957; for an updated 
version, see Wallace 2012), which Frauchiger and Renner presented as almost the only way 
out to their contradiction in the first version of their paper, is also an alternative. But one may 
also be a Qbist (Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack 2014), or may adhere to a modal interpretation 
(Lombardi and Castagnino 2008) or to a transactional interpretation (Kastner 2013). And one 
may furthermore prefer to admit modifications of the standard formalism and endorse 
dynamical collapse theories (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986; for an updated review, see 
Ghirardi 2018), or Bohmian mechanics (Bohm 1952; for an updated review, see Goldstein 
2017), or the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics (Griffiths 1984; for an 
updated review, see Griffiths 2017). And we apologize in advance for all the interpretations 
that we have not mentioned here. But the fact is that all these options were already open 
before the F-R argument was proposed. And, beyond organizing some of those interpretations 
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according to the violation of some of the assumptions of the paper, the F-R argument closes 
none of them. Of course, F-R is a no-go argument, but one that was very well known since 
long ago. 
Appendix 
As explained in the body of the article, what is at stake is the conjunction of three 
propositions corresponding to three contexts of a single Hilbert space. The problem derives 
from the fact that the three contexts are strictly different, that is, they correspond to different 
bases of the Hilbert space. This can be proved in the following way. 
The propositions : ok : okX Y∧ , : ok :1X B→ , and : ok :Y A h→  can be respectively 
asserted in the following bases of ABH : 
− The basis { }- fail fail , fail ok , ok fail , ok ok= X Y X Y X Y X YX Y  
− The basis { }- fail 0 , fail 1 , ok 0 , ok 1X B X B X B X BX B =  
− The basis { }- fail , fail , ok , okY A Y A Y A Y AY A h t h t=  
In order to simplify notation, let us express the two first bases as: 
{ }- fail , fail , fail ,ok , ok ,fail , ok ,okX Y X Y X Y X YX Y =          (A-1) 
{ }- fail ,0 , fail ,1 , ok ,0 , ok ,1X B X B X B X BX B =            (A-2) 
Now let us define the observables XYO  and XBO , associated with the bases X-Y and X-B 
respectively, as follows: 
1 2
3 4
fail ,fail fail ,fail fail ,ok fail ,ok
ok ,fail ok ,fail ok ,ok ok ,ok
= α +α +
+ α +α
XY X Y X Y X Y X Y
X Y X Y X Y X Y
O
       (A-3) 
1 2
3 4
fail ,0 fail ,0 fail ,1 fail ,1
ok ,0 ok ,0 ok ,1 ok ,1
= β +β +
+ β +β
XB X B X B X B X B
X B X B X B X B
O
          (A-4) 
In order to know whether XYO  and XBO  commute, let us express XBO  (eq. (A-4)) in the basis 
X-Y (eq. A-1)):  
( ) ( )1 2 1 21 fail , fail fail , fail fail , fail fail ,ok2=  β + β + β −β +XB X Y X Y X Y X YO  
             ( ) ( )1 2 1 2fail ,ok fail , fail fail ,ok fail ,okX Y X Y X Y X Y+ β −β + β + β +  
             ( ) ( )3 4 3 4ok ,fail ok , fail ok , fail ok ,okX Y X Y X Y X Y+ β + β + β −β +  
             ( ) ( )3 4 3 4ok ,ok ok , fail ok ,ok ok ,okX Y X Y X Y X Y+ β −β + β + β    (A-5) 
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The commutator [ ],XY XBO O  is zero if XBO  is also diagonal in the basis X-Y. As eq. (A-5) 
shows, this happens only when 1 2β = β  and 3 4β = β , that is, when XBO  is degenerate 
regarding its eigenvalues 1 2β = β  and 3 4β = β . This would imply that the propositions 
: fail : 0∧X B  and : fail :1∧X B  would be indistinguishable since represented by the same 
number, and the same would happen with the : ok : 0∧X B  and : ok :1∧X B . But this is 
contrary to the starting point of the F-R argument, which assumes that the observable B has 
two distinguishable values, represented by different eigenvalues of the corresponding 
operator. Therefore, since 1 2β ≠ β  and 3 4β ≠ β , then [ ], 0≠XY XBO O . Completely analogous 
arguments can be developed to prove that [ ], 0≠XY YAO O  and [ ], 0≠XB YAO O . 
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